Brilliant application of Stigler to enforcement structure itself. The point about institutional competition raising capture costs is underappreciated in policy debates that frame state enforcement as "fragmentation" instead of discipline. I've seen this play out in tech regulation where federal inaction basicaly invites state AG action. The Bootleggers and Baptists framing helps explain why complexity persists even when efficiency doesnt.
Appreciate this. That “fragmentation vs. discipline” framing is the crux—once enforcement is treated as a single chokepoint, capture is cheap; once it competes, capture costs explode. The Bootleggers/Baptists layer explains why that structure persists even when it’s inefficient. Federal inaction doesn’t just fail to prevent state action—it induces it. That’s the equilibrium shift the paper tries to formalize.
Brilliant application of Stigler to enforcement structure itself. The point about institutional competition raising capture costs is underappreciated in policy debates that frame state enforcement as "fragmentation" instead of discipline. I've seen this play out in tech regulation where federal inaction basicaly invites state AG action. The Bootleggers and Baptists framing helps explain why complexity persists even when efficiency doesnt.
Appreciate this. That “fragmentation vs. discipline” framing is the crux—once enforcement is treated as a single chokepoint, capture is cheap; once it competes, capture costs explode. The Bootleggers/Baptists layer explains why that structure persists even when it’s inefficient. Federal inaction doesn’t just fail to prevent state action—it induces it. That’s the equilibrium shift the paper tries to formalize.